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Summary
The paper opens the neoclassical growth model to unerap loyir.ent
and inflation and solves for steady-state equilibrium rates
of growth and interest. A price equation is derived from
profit miaximization and includes the wage expectations of the
entrepreneurs. A wage equation is based on the Phillips
function and includes the price expectations of labor. A
price-wage equilibrium is defined as self-fulfilling expect-
ations. The existence and the properties of such an equili-
brium are examined. Policy conclusions are drawn. Finally
the paper determines the extent to which Wicksellian, Keynes-
ian, and monetarist ideas may coexist in neoclassical growth.
(Tentative draft of a chapter in a forthcoming book. Feedback requested.)
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THE PRICE-WAGE SPIRAL:
COULD WICKSELL. KEYNES. AND MONETARISTS COEXIST IN NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH?
Hans Bi-ems
Univevsity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign "
Zusammenf assung
Der Vortrag fligt die Inflation und die Arbei tsl osi gkei t in das neoklas-
sische Wachstumsmodel 1 hinein und bestimmt die Zinshohe und die Wachs-
tunisraten der Produktion, der Preise, der Geldmenge, des Kapi ta 1 vorra ts
und des Nominal- und Reallohns. Eine Prei sg 1 ei chung v/ird mit einer
Lohngl ei Chung kon
f
ronti ert
. Die Prei sgl ei chung ist eine Wi ederspi egel
-
ung der Gewinnmaximi erung und enthalt die Lohnerwartungen der Unterneh-
mer. Die Lohngleichung ist eine Wiederspiegelung der Phillipskurve und
enthalt die Prei serwartungen der Arbeiter. Prei sstei gerungen und Nomi-
nal lohnstei gerungen sind mit einander in Gl ei chgev/i cht , wenn alle Erwar-
tungen in Erfullung gehen. Die Existenz und die Eigenschaften eines
solchen Glei chgewi chts werden untersucht und die Konsequenzen fur die
Geldpolitik gezogen. Zum Schluss bestimint der Vortrag den Umfang in dem
wi cksel 1 i ani sches , keynesi an
i
sches und monetari sti sches Gedankengut in
einem solchen Model! koexistieren kann.
The purpose of the present paper is to open the neoclassical growth
model to unemployment and inflation and see to what extent VJicksell-
ian, Keynesian, monetarist, and neoclassical ideas could coexist
in it. In two respects we shall modify the standard Solow (1956)
neoclassical growth model.
First, our labor market will not be assumed to clear. But
let there be a price equation derived from profit maximization and
including the wage expectations of the entrepreneurs. Let there be
a wage equation representing a Phillips function and including the price
expectations of labor. Let a price-wage equilibrium be defined as

self-fulfilling expectations. We shall examine the existence and
the properties of such an equilibrium. .
; _
.•'•;',
^
Second, v;e shall need a bare minimum of monetary arrange-
ments: Let there be a money market in which firms may borrow
by selling interest-bearing claims upon themselves. Such claims -
are bought b2/ savers and m.onetary authorities alike. The mone-
tary authorities may expand their stock of claims, and v/ith it
the money supply, more or less rapidly. The pace at which they
expand it will affect the yield of the claims. Let the nominal
rate of interest be defined as that yield. •. ; ; • ,
NOTATION
VaviaD les
C = physical consumption
D = demand for money
g = proportionate rate of growth of variable v
L , M , P , r , p , S , w , X , and Y
C
,
D , I , K ,
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I E physical investment
k = present gross v;orth of another physical unit of capital stock
K = physical marginal productivity of capital stock
L = labor employed
X =. proportion employed of available labor force
M r supply of noney
H E present net worth of entire physical capital stock
n = present net worth of another physical unit of capital stock
P E price of goods
p = one coefficient of Phillips function representing inflation-
ary potential '
r Enorainalrateofinterest
p 5 real rate of interest
S 5 phN'sical capital stock
w = noney wage rate
X = physical output
Y = money income
Parameters
a = multiplicative factor of production function
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a, 3 = exponents cf production function
c Epropensitytoconsume
F = available labor force
g = proportionate rate of gr^owth of parameter v = a and FV "
m = multiplicative factor of demand for money function
y = exponent of demand for money function
ir = exponent of Phillips function
(}) = another coefficient of Phillips function
All parameters are stationary except a and F whose growth
rates are stationary. Let us now specify our modified neoclass-
ical growth model.
II. A MODIFIED NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL
I. definitions
Define the proportionate rate of growth

(1)
dv 1
dt V
Define investment as the derivative of capital stock with
resoect to time
:
(2) I =
dS
dt
2. Production and the Price Equation
Let entrepreneurs apply a Cobb-Douglas production function
(3) X = aL^S^
where 0<a<l; 0<6<1; a + Q - 1 ; and a > 0. Let profit
maximization under pure competition equalize' real wage rate and

physical marginal productivity of labor:
CO
w 3X X
P 3 L L
Write ( 4 ) as
w L
p -
a X
used in Chapter 5 to demonstrate that the neoclassical Tnodel
has mark-up pricing, too: Neoclassical price P exceeds per-unit
labor cost wL/X in the proportion 1 /a . Differentiate this form
of (U) with respect to time and find
(5) Sy
telling us that, given their expectations of the rates of growth
of the money wage rate g and of per-unit labor input g. - gv > entrew L X

preneurs will charge the price (5). Our price equation has em
piricai support: In their price equaticn Eckstein and Gircia
(1976) found no rcc-m for demand represented by, say, the rate
of unemployment; "actual prices stay near equilibrium and
trace out the ccst curves," 328.
Physical marginal productivity of capital stock is
(6)
ax
3S
3. Investment Demand
Let N be the present net worth of new capital stock S installed
by an entrepreneur. Let his desired capital stock be the size
of stock maximizing present net worth
for a maximum is
irst-order condition
(7) n =
SN
SS

To find desired capital stock, proceed as folio ws. Let
entrepreneurs be purely competitive ones, hence price of out-
put ? is beyond their control. At time t, therefore, value
marginal productivity of another physical unit of capital stock
is ic(t)P(t). As seen from the present time t, value marginal
- 1' ( t - T )productivity at time t is K(t)P(t)e ^ , where r is the
stationary nominal rate of interest usee as a discount rate.
Define present gross worth of another physical unit of capital
stock as the present worth of all its future value marginal pro-
ductivities over its entii"'e useful life:
(8) k(T) S /; <(t)?(t)e-^^^ - ^^dt
Let entrepreneurs expect physical marginal productivity of
capital stock to be growing at the stationary rate g. :
(9) ic(t) = k(t)
cf ( T)
and price of ouxput to be gi^owing at the stationary rate g

c _
(10) P(t) = P(T)e
gp(t - T)
Insert (9) and (10) into (8), define
(11) P = ^ - (g^ + gp)
and wrixe the integral (8) as
k(T) = Z"" <(T)P(T)e'P^^ " ^^dt
T
Neither k(t) nor P(t) are functions of t, hence may be taken
outside of the integral sign. Our g , gp, and r were all said
to be stationary, hence the coefficient p of t is stationary,
too. Assume p > 0. As a result, find the integral to be
(12) k = kP/p
Find present net worth of another physical unit of capital
stock as its gross worth minus its price: .
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(13) n = k - P = (k/p - 1)P
Applying our first-order condition (7) to our result (13)
find equilibrium physical marginal pi"-oduct ivity of capital
stock
(14) K = p
Finally take (6) and (lU) together and find desired capital
stock
(15) S = 0X/P
Apply the definitions (1) and (2) to (15) and find desired
investment as the derivative of desired capital stock with re-
spect to time:
(16)
dS
I = — = Bg,.X/p
dt '^
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(15) and (15) are capital stock and investment desired bj'
an individual entrepreneur. Except X everything on the right-hand
sides of (15) and (15) is common to all entrepreneurs. Factor
out all common factors, sum over all entrepreneurs, then X becomes
national output, and (15) and (16) become national desired capital
stock and investment. So desired investment is in direct proport-
ion to the elasticity 3 of output with respect to capital srock,
the rate of growth g of output, and output X itself. Desired
A
investment is in inverse proportion to p. As we shall see in
Sec. Ill, 2, p is the real rate of interest. Our investment
function (16) neatly encompasses Wickseilian, Keyr.esian, mone-
tarist, and post-Keynesian ideas.
4. yiokseZliar., Keynesian , Monetarist , and Post-Keynesian i?t-
vestment
VJicksell (1935), 193, defined a rate of interest which would
equal "the expected yield on the nev;iy created capital" and
called it a "natural" rate. Keynes (1936), 135, defined the
same thing but called it "the marginal efficiency of capital"
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Wicksell and Keynes would have agreed with our Eq. (14) that
"new investment will be pushed to the point at which the mar-
ginal efficiency of capital becomes ec^ual to the rate of in-
terest," Keynes (1936), 184, But as we saw in Chapters 1 and
2, neither Wicksell nor Keynes distinguished between a nominal
and a real rate of interest.
Monetarists like Turgot (1898), ug, Fisher (1896), 8-9,
and Mundell (1971) did distinguish: Investment would not be
lower just because the nominal rate of interest were higher;
only "an increase in the real interest rate lowers investment,"
Mundell (1971) , 16
.
Given an incremental capital coefficient b, post-Xeynesian:
like Harrod (19U8) determine desired investment as I = bcX/dt
= bgyX. As in (16) investment is in direct proportion to the
rate of growth of output and to output itself.
5. Consumption Demand
Let consumption be a fixed proportion c of output

(17) C = c X
where < c < 1
6. Goods-Market Eouilibr-ium
Goods-market equilibrium requires the supply of goods to equal th<
den and for them:
( 1 8 ) X = C + I
7. Employment, the Phillips Function^ and the Wage Equation
Let labor employed be the proportion \ of available labor force
(IS) L = XF
where < A < 1, and X is so far not a function of time

- 14 -
Within their province let labor unions seek a relative and
temporary gain by raising the money wage rate. Knowing that
the gain will be temporary will not keep them from seeking it;
on the contrary, in anticipating inflation they are compelled
to contribute to it. The original Phillips (1958) curve had no
room for labor's inflationary expectations, but Eckstein and
Girola (1978), 325-327, found unemployment and current inflation
to be "the bulk of the explanation". We write a modern Phillips
function by subtracting employment (19) from available labor
force F, finding the unemployment fraction to be 1 - A, and in-
corporating labor's inflationary expectations gp :
(20) g„ = P(l - A) + <j>gp
where <j> >_ , tt < , and p is so far not a function of time. Our
wage equation (20) tells us that, given its expectations of the
rate of growth of price g. , labor will insist on the rate of
growth of the money wage rate (20).
8. National Money Income
With immortal capital stock, the entire value of national out-
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put represents value added, i. e. , national money income
(21) Y E PX
9. Money
Let the demand for money be a function of national money income
and the nominal rate of interest:
(22) D = mYr^
where p < and ra > 0.
20. Money-Market Equ-ilibrium
Money-market equilibrium requires the supply of money to equal
the demand for it:
(23) M = D
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Let us now solve our model for its steady-state equilibrium
rates of growth and interest.
III. STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIUM GROWTH
-RATE AND INTEREST-RATE SOLUTIONS
1. Steady-State Growth
3y taking derivatives with respect to time of all equations in-
volving the thirteen variables C, D, I, <, L, M, P, r, p, S, w,
X, and Y the reader may convince himself that the system (1)
through (23) is satisfied by the following growth-rate solutions
(2.) g^ = g^ (27) g^ = g^ - gs
(25) g^ - g^ (28) g^ = g^
(26) gj = g^ (29) g^ = g^

p(l - A)^ - g /a p(l - X)^ - (|)g /a
(30) g^ ^— (34) g^ = ^—
1 - (J) 1 - ^
(31) g^ = (35) gy_ = g^/a + g„
(32) gp = (36) g^ = gj, ^ g.^
(33) g^ = g^
Our growth was steady-state growth, for no right-hand side
of our solutions (2U) through (36) was a function of time the
employment fraction \ and the coefficient p were assumed not to be
2. Rates of Interest
wicksell (1935), 193, 201, defined a rate of interest which would
equilibrate saving with investment and called it a "normal" rate.
Keynes (1930) defined the same rate but called it a "natural" one
Our own system meets that condition: Insert (17) into (18) and
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find
(37) (1 - c)X = I
Keynes (1936), 167, defined a rate of interest which would
equilibrate the available quantity of cash with the desire to
hold it. Our Eq. (23) shows that our own system meets that con-
dition, too. But unlike the Wicksellian and Keynesian systems,
our system has two interest rates. Its real rate of interest is
found by inserting solutions (27) and (33) into our definition
(11):
(38)
To solve for p insert (15) into (37), assume nonzero phys-
ical output X, divide X away, and find
(39) p = Bgjj/(1 - c)
where gy stands for our solution (35). The properties of (39)
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are quite Fisherian. In a thrifty economy a low propensity to
consume c will make the real rate of interest p lov/: "Where,
as in Scotland, there are educational tendencies which instill
the habit of thrift from childhood, the rate of interest tends
to be low," Fisher (1930), 478. In a rapidly growing economy
a high g will make the real rate of interest p high: "...the
A
constant stream of new inventions, by making the available
income streams rich in the future, ax the sacrifice of immediate
income, tends to make the rate of interest high," Fisher (1930),
481 .
Insert (39) into (38) and find the nominal rate of inter-
est
(40) Bgj^/(l - c) + gp
where g_ and g stand for solutions (30) and (35), respectively
if A
Insert (36) into (29) and find the rate of growth of the
money supply which would uphold (39) and (40):
(41) Sm = Sf ^ g„
where g stands for the solution (34)
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2. Self-Fulfilling Expectations
Cur equilibrium growth implies self-fulfilling expectations.
We used the same symbol for the expected and realized values
of any variable, implying the equality between the two. Is
such equality always possible? Yes if the system has a set of
solutions. No if the system has no such set. Our system did
have the set of solutions (2^) through (41).
Specifically, then, our price-wage equilibrium solutions
imply two things. First, that if entrepreneurs expect labor
to adopt the solution value (34) of the rate of growth of the
money wage rate then the entrepreneurs will adopt the solution
value (30) of the rate of growth of price. Second, that if
labor expects entrepreneurs to adopt the solution value (30)
of the rate of growth of price then labor will adopt the solu-
tion value (34) of the rate of growth of the money wage rate.
4. Infinitely Many Solutions
Our system has infinitely many solutions, i. e., for a given
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employment fraction X one for each value of the coefficient p,
and for each value of the coefficient p one for each employment
fraction A. The reason for such openness is easily seen. Nowhere
did we assume the labor market to clear A to equal one. No-
where did we think of the coefficient p as an equilibrating vari-
able in such a labor-market clearance. So far, v;e are begging
the question of how A and p are determined. Are they determined
by public policy? VJill they be what the monetary authorities
allow them to be? In Sec. V we shall see.
5. Some Solutions Az'e Not Depending on A and p
We find gp and g , and with them A and o, to be absent from the
growth-rate solutions for the eight variables C, I, K , L, r, p,
S, and X and from our solution for the real rate of interest p.
Subtract (30) from (34) and find the rate of growth of the
real wage rate
(42)
'w/P Sw - Sp = ga/«

- 22 -
from which X and p have disappeared. Their disappearance has
an important consequence now to be spelled out.
6. Friedman* s "Natural" Rate of Unemployment
Friedman (1968), 8, defined a "natural" rate of unemployment as
one at which "real wage rates are tending on the average to rise
at a 'normal' secular rate, i. e., at a rate that can be indefin-
itely maintained so long as capital formation, technological im-
provements, etc. , remain on their long-run trends" . But our real
wage rate was growing like that for any value of the employment
fraction A. Any value of the unemployment fraction 1 - X was a
Friedmanian "natural" rate! Friedman's "natural" rate was not
unique .
7. Other Solutions Are Depending on X and p
We find g and g , and with them X and p, to be present in the
r W
growth-rate solutions for the remaining five variables D, M, P,
w, and Y and in our solution for the nominal rate of interest :
That brings us to the price-wage spiral.
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IV. THE PRICE-WAGE SPIRAL
2. Algebraic Solutions (30) and (34) Seen Graphiaally
Insert (2S) and (35) into cur price equation (5). Write th*
price and wage eauations with g on the left-hand side:
(42) g„ = Sa/^ ^ Sp
(20) g.^ = p(l - ^)'" + *gp
and plot them in Figure 1 having g on the ver^tical axis and
w
g on the horizontal axis. The price equation ('+2) will then
appear as a single straight line with the intercept g /a and
the slope one. The wage equation (20) will appear as a family
of straight lines with the intercepts p(l - X) and the slope ip
Our price-wage equilibrium (30) and (3U.) is represented graph-
ically by the intersection between the price-equation line and
a wage-equation line. Intersection points are marked by double
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High X or p
* = O:
The Original Phillips Curve
%
<^ * I:
No Price-Wage Equilibrium
< 4: < 1:
Stable Price-Wage Equilibrium
%
1 < ij! < "
:
Unstable Price-Wage Equilibrium
1^ -4- «
No Inflation
Proportionate Rate of Growth of Price
Figure 1. The Price-Wage Equilibrium: Five Possibilities
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circles in Figure 1
2. Sensit-ivity of the Price-Wage Equilibrium to (j) and v(l - X; TT
Let (}) rise from zero to infinity and distinguish the five cases
shown in Figure 1.
First, let 4 = . Failing to include labor's inflationary-
expectations, this is the case of the original Phillips curve.
The v/age eq^uation appears as a family of horizontal lines drawn
TT TT
in the distance p(l - X) from the horizontal axis. If p(l - A)
is less than, equal to, or greater than g /a then the rate of in-
flation g^ will be negative, zero, or positive, respectively.
In other words, the rate of inflation is the higher the higher
the employment fraction A and the coefficient p.
Second, let < 4> < 1 . Now the wage ^^^quation appears as
a family of positively sloped lines with the intercepts p(l - A) .
Their slope ^ is less than one, hence they intersect the price
-equation line from above, -..id the equilibria are stable. If,
say, labor overshoots Vecause it expects a gp higher than the equ:
librium value (30), entrepreneurs will respond along their price
-equation line and raise price less than labor expected. Labor
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v;ill go frcr. there and respond along its wage -equat ion line and
overshoot less. And so it goes. The parties are moving back to-
wards the equilibrium point. Again if p(l - X) is less fhan
,
equal to, or greater than g^/a then the rate of inflation g will
be negative, zero, or positive, respectively. Again the rate of
inflation is the higher the higher the employment fraction A and
the coefficient p.
Third, let (J) -^ 1 . Mow the wage equation appears as a family
of lines with unitary slope and the intercepts p(l - X)' . All
have the same slope as the price -equat ion line and one of them
may coincide with the latter. If it does there are infinitely
many solutions, otherwise there is no finite solution: The
limits of (30) and (34) are
lira gp = lim g^
({)-*- 1 (^ -> 1
+ CO
Fourth, let !<({)<<». Now the wage equation appears as
IT
a family of positively sloped lines with the intercepts p(l - A)
Their slope 14) is greater than one, hence they intersect the price
-equation line from below, and the equilibria are unstable. If,
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say, labor overshoots because it expects a g higher than the
equilibrium value (30), entrepreneurs will respond along their
price-equation line and raise price moi^e thaii labor expected.
Labor will go from thei-^e and respond along its wage-equation line
and overshoot even more. And so it gcss. The parties are nov;
veering farther and farther av;ay from, the equilibrium point.
Again the rate of inflation will depend on the employment frac-
tion X and the coefficient p but in an upside-down way: Now if
p(l - A)' is less than, equal to, or greater than g /ct then the
a
rate of inflation will be positive, zero, or negative, re-
spectively. In o-her words, the rate of inflation is the lower
the higher the employment fraction X and the coefficient p!
Fifth, let (t -*- » . Now the wage equation appears as a family
of lines all of which are merging into the vertical axis. Divide
the numerator and denominator of (314) by 4* and see that the
limits of (30) and (34) are
liffi gp =
lim g
d.
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P(l - X)" - qja
1 - *
1 P(l - >.)
p(l - X)' - Qj/a
1 - *
Figure 2. Mapping the Function (30)
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Here an explosive situatior. mighT seem to have beer, defused
into the harmless one of no inflation. But the equilibriur. is
still unstable.
A direct rr.apping of the function (30) v.'ould also have de-
monstrated the sensitivity of our price-wage equilibrium to $
and p(l - X) . Such mapping is shown in Figure 2.
Canalus-ion: Inflation Is an Empty Ritua':
Subtracting (3C) from (3^•), our Sec. Ill, 5 above found (42)
according to which the rate of grovrth of the real wage rate was
g /0£ . The employment fraction X and the coefficient p had dis-
appeared from (42), and Figure 1 agrees: All our double -c ircled
price-wage equilibria are located on the single price-equation
line (4-2). With or without inflation labor can have a real wage
rate growing at the rate g /a, no more, no less. In that sense
inflation is an empty ritual. Why bother to go through with it?
Could monetary policy gently persuade the parties not to bother?
If so, what exactly should monetary policy be doing?
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4. The Coefficient p as a Measure cf the Inflationavj Potential
and a Target for Monetary Policy
As long as 4> < 1 , our equilibrium solution (3C) as well as Figure
1 suggest that a lov;er rate of inflation g^ v;ould require a de-
pressed p(l - X) . That, in turn, would require either a depressed
employment fraction X or a depressed coefficient p. The monetary
authorities, no doubt, would much prefer the latter to the former:
A given reduction of inflation should be accomplished by reducing
the employment fraction X as little as possible. The coefficient
p is the v/eight with v;hich unemployment 1 - X makes itself felt
in the Phillips function. If the monetary authorities could reduce
that weight they wouldn't have to depress X itself.
In order to eliminate inflation, how far would p have to be-
pressed? The numerator of our equilibrium solution (30), and with
it the rate of inflation gp, could become zero in one and only one
IT
way, i. e., if p(l - X) = g /a or
a
(43) p = g /Cad - X)"]
shown as the double-circled point on the horizontal axis of Figure
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2, In the sense that inflation could be depressed to zero by de-
pressing p to (h3) the coefficient p nay be called a measure of
the inflationary poteniial of the econorr.y and may serve as a
target for monetary policy.
It follows from (43) that the value to which p v;ould have to
be depressed to eliminate inflation is the higher the higher the
technological progress g and the lower the employment fraction -\.
a
In ether words, high technological progress makes inflation fight-
ing easier, but a high employment fraction makes it n-.or-e difficult
V. MONETARY POLICY
Gur solutions (24) through (41) defined infinitely many steady
-state equilibrium growth tracks. Once settled on any one of
them, the economy will tend to stay on it: On such a track,
whatever its employment fraction X is and whatever its inflation-
ary potential p is, e.xpectat ions will be self-fulfilling, and
self-fulfilling exDectations are not abandoned easilv. They
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will be abandoned only after new experience has proved them
nons elf- fulfilling.
Could such new experience be generated by monetai''y policy
trying to switch the economy from one steady-state equilibrium
growth track to another deemed more desirable? Let us allow
the employment fraction X and the inflationary potential p
to vary with time. Let us consider anti-inflation policy
and employment policy/ separately.
1. Anti-Inflation Policy
As long as (f> < 1 a price-wage equilibrium exists and is stable.
Let the monetary authorities try to sx-/itch the economy from a
high-p steady-state equilibrium growth track to a lov;-p one.
In their effort to depress p let them force the m.oney supply
to be growing at a rate lower than its steady-state equilibrium
value C^l). At so far unchanged expectations gp , the nom.inal
and real rates of interest will now rise above their equilibri-
um levels (40) and (39), respectively. In (16) desired invest-
ment was in inverse oroDortion to the real rate of interest,
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whereas in (17) desired c onsumpt ior. v;as invariant with it.
Raising the real rate of interest, then, will lower the right
-hand side of the equilibrium conditio a (18): There will be
negative excess demand.
The immediate effect is inventory accumulation, and in-
ventory accumulation may release two responses, a price re-
sponse and a quantity response. The hope underlying anri-infla-
ticn policy is that the price response v.'ill dominate, i. e.
,
that inventory accumulation will be read as a signal to decele-
rate price .
Decelerating price would directly reduce the second term,
of the Phillips function (20) by reducing g, but in itself sucli
a direct effect would accomplish nothing. It would reduce gp
below its equilibrium value (30), creating a nonself -fulfilling
expectation. But as long as neither A nor p have been affected,
the stable price- wage equilibrium would try to restore ixself.
The hope underlying ant i- inf lat ion policy must be that there
will be an additional, indirect, effect. Labor is experiencing
receding inflation at a real wage rate growing as always at the
rate g /a. The hope is that such soothing experience might de-
s.
press the first term of the Phillips function by depressing the
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inflationary potential p.
Hov;ever this may be, decelerating price will not eliminate
negative excess deinand. According to (15) and (17) neither desi-
red investment nor consuniption will be stimulated, for P appears
nowhere in (16) and (17). Unable to elininate negative excess
demand, the falling inflationary potential p should keep falling.
When it has fallen far enough to satisfy the policy maker, the
latter may restore the real rate of interest to its equilibrium
level (39)
.
V7hat if (p > 1? Here there is either an unstable price-wage
equilibrium or no equilibrium at all. The price-wage spiral may
be accelerating in a northeasterly direction something like
Figure 3 recording seven OECD countries 1966-1977. Here the mone-
tary authorities must attend to first things first. The wild
northeasterly flight must be stopped, and the authorities do have
a veto. They may refuse to meet the accelerating transaction de-
mand for money. The effects of a refusal are much like those de-
scribed for the case 9 < 1. But the doses of monetary restraint
might have to be heavier and to be applied incessantly if monetar}'-
restraint were to be a substitute for the stability of equilibrium
Is !^ > 1 likely to happen? Surveying 1963-19 75 inflation
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theory Frisch (1977) reports that most empirical work has found
< 1 , that Gordon (1975) was unable to reject the hypothesis that
(p - 1 after 1971, and that ^ may vary procyc li cally , The latter
possibility fits the events recorded in Figure 3.
2. Employment Policy
Suppose it is not considered enough to reduce inflation without
reducing the employment fraction A. The latter should be raised!
Let the monetary authorities try to switch the economy from a
low -A steady-state equilibrium growth track to a high-A one.
In their effort to raise A let them allow the money supply
to be growing at a rate higher than its steady-state equilibrium
••jlue (41). At so far unchanged expectations g^, the nominal
and real rates of interest will now fall below their equilibri-
um levels (1G) and (39), respectively. In (16) desired invest-
ment was in inverse proportion to the real rate of interest,
whereas in (17) desired ccnsum.ption was invariant v/ith it.
Lowering the real rate of interest, then, will raise the right
-hand side of the ecuilibrium condition (13): There will be
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positive excess demand.
The irrimediate effect is inventory depletion, and inventory
depletion may release two responses, a price response and a
quantity response. The hope underlying err.pioymen" policy is
that the quantity response will doniinate> i. e., that inventory
depletion will be read as a signal to accelerate physical out-
put. Can entrepreneurs heed the signal? Write ('+) as L = aPX/w
So accelerating physical output X would accelerate employment L
and raise the employrient fraction X always feasible under
unemployment
.
.'Ice el erat ing physical output will not eliminate positive
excess demand. According to (16) and (17) both desired invest-
ment and consumption are in direct proportion to physical out-
put X. Consequently the difference C + I - X, positive e.xcess
demand, is also in direct proportion to physical output X. Un-
able to eliminate positive excess demand, the expanding employ-
ment fraction A should keep expanding. When it has expanded
far enough to satisfy the policy maker, the latter may restore
the real rate of interest to its equilibrium level (39).
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3. Comparison
The dilemma of monetary policy is neatly illustrated by the
fact that anti-inflation policy and employment policy are
based on mutually exclusive hopes. The former hopes for
a price response, the latter for a quantity response. The
actions taken by the monetary authorities under the two po-
licies are mutually exclusive: One policy is theother in
reverse.
VI. HOW FAR DID OUR SYNTHESIS GO?
We opened the neoclassical grov/th model to unemployment and
inflation and solved for its steady-state equilibrium rates
of grov/th and interest. To what extent could 'Wicksellian,
Keynesian, monetarist, and neoclassical ideas coexist in it?
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1. Wiaksell
Was our incdel rticksellian? Yes, but only in the sense that it deter-
mined a rate of interest at which saving equals investment. That
equality guaranteed neither full eniplo^/ment nor absence of in-
flation: Our infinitely many solutions, one for each value of
the employment fraction X and one for each value of the infla-
tionary potential p, all had the same real rate of interest.
2. Keynes
To J. B. Say output v;as bounded by supply. Demand was no
problem: Supply vrculd generate its ov;n demand. To J. K. Keynes
output was bounded by demand. Supply was no problem: Dem.and
v.'ould generate its own supply. Output v;ould be controllable
:o the extent dem.and v;as. Was our model Keynesian? es in
the sense that output was bounded by dem.and and touched no
supply bound: C < X < 1. Was dem.and controllable? Certain-
ly. The monetary authorities could expand their stock of claims,
and with it the money supply, m.ore or less rapidly. The pace at
which they would expand it v.'ould affect the yield of the claims
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and might generate positive or negative excess demand, respect-
ively. The response to such excess demand was not controllable
Whether the response would be a price response or a quantity
response was beyond the control of the monetary' authorities.
3. Monetarists
V/as our model monetarist? Yes, but only in the sense that it
might generate inflation and that it distinguished between a
nominal and a real rate of interest. In its infinitely many
solutions, one for each value of the employment fraction A,
the real wage rate was found to be growing at the same rate,
and in that sense any value of the unemployment fraction 1 - X
was a Friedmanian "natural" rate of unem.p Icyment . Friedman's
"natural" rate of unemployment v/as not unique.
4. Neoalassicals
Was our model neoclassical? Yes, but only in the sense that
it simulated labor-capital substitution in a steady-state
equilibrium growth setting: According to our solutions (28),
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(33), and (35) capital intensity S/L was growing steadily at
the rate g S/L ^s - Sl = e^/cc
In cne respect our model was not neoclassical. Its goods
and money markets cleared alright, but izs labor market did not
The model had rooiTi for involuntary unemployment: < A < 1.
It had infinitely .Tiany solutions, i. e. , for a given employment
fraction A one for each value of the inflationary potential ::
,
and for each value of the inflationary potential p one for
each employment fraction X. As a result, public policy had
scope for a tradeoff betv;een unemployment and inflation.
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FOOTNOTE
1 Friedman added another definition: "The 'natural rate of un-
employment,' in other words, is the level that would be ground
out by the V/alrasian system of general equilibrium equations,
provided there is embedded in them the actual structural char-
acteristics of the labor and commodity markets..." Thus defin-
ed, is Friedman's natural rate unique?
Surveying the Phillips-curve literature, Santomero and
Seater (1978), 515, found "a comm.on albeit unverified assump-
tion" that V/alrasian general equilibrium is unique. Few macroeccn-
cmic writers offer general equilibria well enough specified to be
shown to be unique!
Few of those who believe that labor markets will clear,
demonstrate why. Those v;ho do, usually apply search- theoret ica 1
explanations. As Tobin (1972), 5-9, points out, in such explana-
tions all unem.ployment is voluntary. Do Walrasian equations,
"provided there is embedded in them the actual structural char-
acteristics of the labor and commodity markets," rule out invo-
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luntary unemployrrient ? Friedman does not offer general equilibria
well enough specified, let alone modified, zo ansvjex^ such a
cues t ion
.
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